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SCHOPENHAUER IN RELATION TO KANT.¹

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The discussion of this relation will, it is hoped, be productive of not a little that may prove at once determinative of the one and illustrative of the other. The following is a translation of the entire section (23), which opens in page 85 of the third edition of Schopenhauer's work, "*Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.*"

REFUTATION OF THE PROOF GIVEN BY KANT FOR THE A PRIORI NATURE OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY.

The exposition of the universal validity of the law of Causality for all experience, its *a priori* nature and consequent limitation to the possibility of experience, is a main object of the Kritik of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the proof given there of the *a priori* nature of the proposition. It is, in essentials, as follows: "The synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination that is required for every empirical perception — this synthesis gives succession, but not yet any determinate one: that is to say, it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior, not only in my imagination, but in the object. Determinate order of this succession, however — and through such order alone the contents of perception become experience, or, what is the same thing, such order alone gives authority to judgments objectively valid — this

¹ As preceding and conditioning this paper (which, however, is quite independent), attention is invited to the article, "The Philosophy of Causality: Hume and Kant," in the *Princeton Review*, for January, 1879.

order, then, results alone from the notion of pure understanding named cause and effect. The axiom of the causal relation, therefore, is condition of the possibility of experience, and, as such, given us *a priori*." (See *Krit. d. rein. Vern.*, 1. Aufl., S. 201; 5. Aufl., S. 246.)

According to this, then, the order of the succession of the changes of real objects shall be perceived to be an objective one only first of all by virtue of the causality of these. Kant repeats and illustrates this proposition in the "*Kritik of Pure Reason*," particularly in his "*Second Analogy of Experience*" (1. Aufl., S. 189; vollständiger in der 5. Aufl., S. 232); and, again, in the conclusion of his "*Third Analogy*," [?] which passages I beg every one to read over again, who would understand what follows. He maintains everywhere here that the *objectivity of the succession of the impressions*, which objectivity he explains as its agreement (the succession's agreement) with the succession of real objects; that this objectivity is perceived only through the rule according to which they follow one another—that is to say, through the law of causality; that, consequently, the objective relation of consecutive appearances to sense remains fully undetermined through my mere perception, inasmuch as I only perceive then the sequence of my impressions, and the sequence in my apprehension authorizes no judgment as regards the sequence in the object, unless my judgment support itself on the law of causality; seeing that, moreover, I might, in my apprehension, cause the succession of the perceptions to proceed as well in quite a reverse order, as there is nothing which determines it as objective. In illustration of these propositions, he adduces the example of a house, the parts of which he is able to consider in any required succession—as, from above downwards, or from below upwards; where, therefore, the determination of the succession would be merely subjective, and not realized in any object, because dependent on his will and pleasure. And, as a contrast, he brings forward the perception of a ship driving down stream. Here he perceives the ship ever lower and lower, and he cannot alter this his perception of the succession of its various positions. Hence, in this case, he deduces the subjective suite of his apprehension from the objective suite in the sensible phenomenon; and this latter suite he names, accordingly, a *Begebenheit*—an occurrence, an event, a something that has taken place or happened. Now, against this, I maintain that both cases are *noways different*; that both are occurrences; that the perception of both is objective—that is to say, it is a perception of changes of real objects, perceived as such by the subject. *Both are changes of the position of two bodies in each other's regard*. In the first case, one of these bodies is the corporeal frame proper of the observer himself, or, rather, only a part of it, namely, the eye; and the other is the house, in respect of the parts of which the position of the eye is successively altered. In the second case it is the ship alters its position in respect of the stream, and the alteration, therefore, is between two bodies. Both are occurrences; the only difference is that, in the first case, the alteration proceeds from the body of the

observer himself, whose sensations are, indeed, the starting-point of all the perceptions of it—it itself, nevertheless, being an object among objects, and, consequently, subjected to the laws of this objective corporeal world. The movement of his body by his own will is for him, so far as he is purely perceptive, merely an empirically perceived fact. The order of succession in the change might be as well inverted in the second case as in the first, had but the observer as well the power to draw the ship up stream as to move his eye in an opposite direction to the first one. For it is from the succession of the perceptions of the parts of the house depending on his own will that Kant concludes it not to be objective and not an occurrence. But the movement of his eye in the direction from roof to cellar is one occurrence, and the opposed movement from cellar to roof a second one, quite as much as the movement of the ship. There is no difference here whatever; just as—in regard to its being an occurrence or not—there is no difference whether I pass by a file of soldiers or they pass by me; both are occurrences. If, from the bank, I fix my eyes on a ship passing near it, it will presently appear to me that it is the bank moves, taking me with it, while it is the ship stands still. I am, of course, wrong here in regard to the cause of the relative change of place, seeing that I ascribe the movement to the wrong object; but I perceive objectively, and correctly enough nevertheless, the real succession of the relative positions of my body to the ship. Neither would Kant, in the case adduced by him, have believed himself to find a difference, had he reflected that his body is an object among objects, and that the succession of his empirical perceptions depends on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body, and is, consequently, an objective one—that is, takes place with respect to objects *immediately* (though not mediately), independent of the will of the subject, and can, consequently, very well be perceived without the successive objects that impress his body standing together in a causal connection.

Kant says: Time cannot be perceived; therefore, no succession of impressions can be empirically perceived as objective—that is to say, as alterations of the sensible phenomena, in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions. The objectivity of an alteration can be cognized only through the law of causality, which is a rule in accordance with which states follow each other. And the result of his allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will. I must allege against all this that sensible phenomena may very well *follow on* one another without *following from* one another. And this noways prejudices the law of causality. For it remains certain that every change is the effect of another, so much standing, *a priori*, fixed; still it does not follow on that one only which is its cause, but on all others which are simultaneous with this latter, and with which it (the effect) stands not in any causal connection. It is perceived by me, not only in the series of causes and effects, but in a quite other one,

which, however, is not, on that account, any the less objective, and very easily distinguished from any subjective one dependent on my own will — as, for example, that of my phantasmata. The succession in time of occurrences which stand not in causal connection is what we call *chance* (*Zufall*), a word derived from the *Zusammenfallen* — the falling together, the encountering, the contingency of what are in no connection — just like τὸ συμβεβηχὸς from συμβαίνειν. (Comp. Arist. Anal., post. I. 4.) I step out of doors, and a tile, falling from the roof, hits me; there is no causal connection between my stepping out and this falling of the tile; nevertheless, the succession — namely, that my movement preceded that of the tile — is objectively determined in my apprehension, and not subjectively by my own will; which otherwise, indeed, would rather have reversed the succession. In the same way the succession of the notes in a piece of music is objectively determined, and not subjectively by me who listen to them; but who will say that such musical notes follow each other according to the law of cause and effect. Nay, even the succession of day and night is, beyond doubt, objectively perceived by us, but these are certainly not apprehended as cause and effect, the one of the other; and, in regard to their common cause, the world, until Copernicus, was in error, without the correct perception of their succession in any way suffering therefrom. And by this, too, let it be said in passing, is the hypothesis of Hume refuted; inasmuch as the oldest and wholly exceptionless succession of day and night has, for all that, never misled any one to conclude, through custom, that the one is the cause of the other.

Kant says, in the same place, that an impression manifests objective reality (that, of course, means is distinguished from mere phantasmata) only by this: that we perceive its necessary connection with other impressions, as in subjection to a rule (the law of causality), and its place in a determinate order of our impressions as in relation of time. But of how few impressions do we know the place given to them in the causal series by the causal law! And yet we can always distinguish the objective ones from the subjective ones — real objects from phantasmata. In sleep, the brain being then isolated from the peripheral nervous system, and thereby from external impressions, this distinction is impossible to us; and, therefore, in our dreams we take phantasmata to be real objects, and only when we awake, only when the sensible nerves and the external universe with them return into consciousness, only then do we perceive our error; at the same time that, even in dream, so long as it is continuous, the causal law maintains its right — only that an impossible material is often imposed upon it. Almost we might believe that Kant, in the passage concerned, had stood under the influence of Leibnitz, however much in his whole philosophy he is opposed to the latter, when we consider, that is, the quite similar expressions of Leibnitz in his *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement* (Liv. IV, ch. 2, § 14), as, for example, “*la vérité des choses sensibles ne consiste que dans la liaison des phénomènes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c'est ce qui les distingue des songes. Le vrai critérium, en matière des objets des sens, est la*

liaison des phénomènes, qui garantit les vérités de fait, à l'égard des choses sensibles hors de nous."

In regard to this whole proof of the *a-priori* and necessary nature of the law of causality from the circumstance that only through means of it do we perceive the objective succession of changes, and that it so far is a condition of experience, Kant has manifestly fallen into an extremely surprising error, and one so palpable that it is only to be explained as resulting from his pre-occupation with the *a priori* part of our knowledge, which has caused him to lose sight of what everybody else must have seen. The only correct proof of the *a priori* nature of the law of causality is given by me in section 21. This *a priori* nature is verified every instant by the immovable certainty with which every one, in all cases, expects from experience that it will take place in accordance with this law — that is, through the apodeictic validity that we attribute to this law — a validity which distinguishes itself from every other such founded on induction — as, for instance, the (empirically known) laws of nature — by this: that it is impossible for us even to think of this law's undergoing an exception anywhere in the world of experience. We may *think*, for example, of the law of gravitation some day ceasing to operate, but not of this taking place without a cause.

Kant, in his proof, has fallen into the opposite error from Hume. This latter, namely, called mere *following*, all *following from*; whereas Kant, again, will have it that there is only *following from*, and no *following* but that. Pure understanding, undoubtedly, can alone comprehend *following from*, but mere *following* as little as the difference between right hand and left, which difference, like mere following, is only to be apprehended by pure sense. The sequence of events in time can certainly, though denied by Kant as cited, be empirically cognized, just as well as the side-by-side of things in space. *How*, however, something *follows on* another in time generally, as little admits of explanation as *how* something *follows from* another; that cognition is given and conditioned by pure sense, as this by pure understanding. But Kant, in holding the objective succession of sensible phenomena to be known only by the clue of causality, falls into the same error with which (Kr. d. r. V., 1. Aufl., S. 275) he reproaches Leibnitz, that, namely, "he intellectualizes the forms of sense." As regards succession, my view is this: From the form belonging to pure sense — *time* — we derive our knowledge of the mere possibility of *succession*. The succession of real objects, the form of which is this same time, we cognize empirically, and, consequently, as *actual*. The *necessity*, however, of a succession of two states — that is, of a change — we cognize only by the understanding, through causality; and that we have the idea of the necessity of a succession is even already a proof that the law of causality is not empirically cognized, but *a priori* given to us. The proposition in general of the sufficient reason expresses, as lying in the innermost of our cognitive faculty, the basal form of a necessary connection among all our objects, which are but subjective states of our own; it is the common form of all such states or objects, and the sole source of the notion of *necessity* — a notion

which, as such, has absolutely no other true meaning or authentication than that of the appearance of the consequent when its antecedent is given. That in the class of objects now under consideration, where this proposition appears as the law of causality, their time-sequence is determined by it, depends upon this: that time is the form of these objects, and, hence, the necessary connection here takes on the shape of a rule of succession. In other shapes of the proposition of sufficient reason, the necessary connection which it everywhere prescribes comes to us in quite other forms than time, and, consequently, not as succession; preserving always, however, the character of a necessary connection, whereby there is manifested the identity of the proposition of sufficient reason in all its shapes — or, rather, the unity of the root of all the laws the expression of which is said proposition.

Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize the *actuality* of the succession merely from its *necessity*; this, however, would presuppose an understanding that embraced all the series of causes and effects at once — that is, an omniscient understanding. Kant has committed the impossible to the understanding, only to stand in less need of sense.

Kant's allegation that objectivity of succession is alone known from the necessity of the sequence of effect on cause, how can it be reconciled with that other (Kr. d. r. V., 1. Aufl., S. 203), which holds the empirical criterion of which of two states is cause, and which effect, to be merely the succession? Who but sees here the most evident circle?

Were objectivity of succession only known from the causality, it would only be thinkable as such, and just nothing but this; for, were it anything else, it would have other distinctive characters by which it might be known, which is just what Kant denies. Consequently, then, Kant being right, we could not say, "This state is effect of that one, and, therefore, follows it;" but the being sequent and the being effect would be one and the same thing, and the *dictum* tautological. And from this abolished difference between *following* and *following from*, Hume would be again vindicated as right when he held all *following from* to be mere *following on*, or denied the difference to exist.

Kant's proof must be limited in this way, then, that empirically we merely cognize *actuality* of succession: but as in certain series of occurrences we cognize, in addition, *necessity* of succession as well, and even know, before all experience, that every possible occurrence must have a determinate place in some one of these series; so there follows at once from this the reality and *a priori* validity of the law of causality, for which validity the proof assigned in section 21 is the only right one.

With Kant's doctrine of objective succession being only possible and cognizable from causal connection, there runs parallel the other of simultaneousness, namely, being only possible and cognizable from reciprocity, as expounded in the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," under the title, "Third Analogy of Experience." Kant goes so far

here as to say "that the simultaneousness of sensible phenomena, not reciprocally influencing each other, but separated, as it were, by a void space, would be no object of a possible perception" (that were a proof *a priori* of there being no void space between the fixed stars); and "that the light which *plays between* our eyes and the bodies in space [an expression which foists in the idea as if not only the light of the stars affected our eye, but our eye it] brings about a community between us and them, and in this way proves the simultaneousness of the latter." This last statement is even empirically false; as the sight of a fixed star noways proves that it is now in the same time with the spectator, but at most that, years ago, frequently only thousands of years ago, it was in existence. For the rest, this doctrine of Kant's stands or falls with the former one; only it is much easier to see through it; besides, the nullity of the whole notion of reciprocity has been already discussed in section 20.

With this examination of the Kantian argument in question, may be compared, should it so please the reader, two earlier attacks on it, namely, that of *Feder*, in his book "Concerning Space and Causality" (S. 29), and that of G. E. Schulze, in his "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (vol. 2, p. 422, *seq.*).

Not without much misgiving have I (1813) ventured to bring forward objections to a leading doctrine — received as proved, and still repeated in the latest authorities (*e. g.*, Fries, *Krit. der Vernunft*, Bd. 2, S. 85) — of the man whose depth of intellect I admire and venerate, and to whom I owe so much, and so much that is great, that his spirit might say to me, in the words of Homer:

Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλουν, ἧ πρὶν ἐπῆεν.

On these extracts from Schopenhauer I venture to comment as follows: In the first sentence I object to the expression "its *a priori* nature, and *consequent* limitation to the possibility of experience." Restriction to the possibility of experience does not follow from apriority as apriority; and neither does Kant advance the claim for apriority as apriority, but only for his own peculiar apriority. Schopenhauer is not fortunate in the passage he selects from Kant in exposition of the relative theory. As I have had occasion to imply more than once elsewhere, the *second analogy of experience* in the "Kritik of Pure Reason" is the most confused and unsatisfactory piece of writing in the whole of Kant's works; and if this be so with the section in general, it is equally so with the selected passage in particular.

He who consults the "Prolegomena" will find that Kant

fairly settled at last into two judgments for the process involved in a causal inference. We first say to ourselves, *When (or if) the sun shines, the stone warms.* There are as yet but two unconnected subjective impressions of this heat and that light. Each is but a separate feeling in our sensory. When we add the second judgment, however, we have connected the two feelings in a single inference, which inference is now objective. But it was the category of cause and effect enabled us to effect this. We possess this category, and, such facts coming to us as the conjunction of light and heat, we feel or see that this conjunction, as an example in point, falls under the rule of cause and effect; and we say, objectively and necessarily, *The sun warms the stone.* I object to this that the explanation is not competent, but a failure; for unless we knew, saw, or felt that the light preceded the heat—unless we knew, saw, or felt that the light *must* precede the heat—we could not have subsumed the facts as a case under the rule. Kant, of course, was quite aware that the synthesis in imagination of the elements of a perceptive act is really *syntheses*, each distinct in its own character, each a perceptive act; but he thought each also contingent, and, indeed, not yet a *perceptive* act proper, till a category acted. He overlooked the fact that this could not be so with at least the synthesis (A B) in causality. *That category could act only* when there was a *recognized first* and a *recognized second*. Kant, then, only invents a necessity to explain a necessity which he must still assume. Nevertheless, in the two judgments referred to, Kant brings what he holds on causality to an articulate shape at last, and we now readily grasp it, and see what he means. It is now explicit; it was only implicit before. One wonders, then, that Schopenhauer, with so much that was better before him, should have confined himself to what was worst.

The section in question, for example, takes up not less than two dozen pages; and if Kant had but had his materials well in hand—causality being alone concerned—he might easily have made one or two pages suffice. As he says himself, his materials for his peculiar work at any time are, first, time and

space, as the two pure or *a priori* phantasms of sense; and, second, the elementary notions of the understanding, as already functions of unity to the various perceptive multiples supplied by these two pure sense-forms. Now, in the case of causality, had time really possessed a multiple typifying the intellectual multiple of antecedent and consequent, an adequate *schema* or frame-work for receiving the correspondent successions of the actual things of sense might have been put together without difficulty, and so the whole transcendental rationale been easily accomplished. But in point of fact, at least as I believe, Kant found himself much perplexed precisely about a multiple in time that would fit such a succession as antecedent and consequent (cause and effect). He was certainly disposed, in the first instance, to find the mere succession of time sufficiently to answer. The *progressus* of time was a necessary one, he said; its course was necessarily from one moment to another; and each moment referred itself necessarily to a preceding one. It presently struck him, I doubt not, however, that there were in things themselves more time-successions than one. There were simple successions — as, the very letters in the word “succession” — and there were also causal successions — as, sun and heat, cloud and shadow, wind and wave, frost and ice, etc. Now, the sound *u*, or the letter *u*, though it follows the sound *s*, or the letter *s*, is not the effect of the sound *s*, or the letter *s*. Volume I is not the cause of volume II, or II of III. Evidently, then, if Kant’s scheme were applied to all successions in time, we should soon have some very pretty examples of the fallacy, *non-causa pro causa*. We assume Kant to have been long puzzled here, and to have been at last convinced of the fact that even *things*, if his *a priori* frame-work were to fit them, or they it, *must have a rule themselves already beforehand*, or they *must in themselves* be such as to correspond to the *schema* applied. But to admit as much was to admit a rule, a necessity, already to exist in that for which, precisely in consequence of its subjectivity and contingency, rule and necessity were the wants! When this occurred to Kant, in what a dreadful quandary (*qu’en dirai-je*) he must have found him-

self—his whole immense system on the topple because of a single miserable particular! Yet such evidently was the state of the facts. If any successive sensations were to be construed into the *schema* and category of Causality, the one of them must be already known to be such that it is always A, as the other, similarly, that it is always B; and that, in the succession A B, B can never stand before A, nor A after B. (W W. II, 164.) In all such cases, my apprehension itself is bound down to a certain order in the very sensations it takes up. What preoccupied Kant, no doubt, was (his *one* problem) the consideration that elements of sense *cannot* have necessity. Still, it must have occurred to him, and did occur to him, that the categorical rule requires its sensuous antitype, which, in the case of causality, must be already a rule (a fixed order); and it is only at last in the “Prolegomena” that he comes to the *distinct* proposal of his two judgments, the one with a rule subjective and the other with a rule objective: 1, when (or if) the sun shines, the stone warms; 2, the sun warms the stone.

With such source of perplexity as this before him, it is no wonder that, in the section in question, he only seems to stumble from one confusion to another. He confounds mere *Wechsel* with *Veränderung* for example, and, though *apprehension* evidently means with him, for the most part, only the subjective synthesis in imagination, he also uses it for the objective synthesis after action of the *schema* and category. What disturbs the reader most, however, is Kant's endless windings in statement and restatement of the necessity that binds the effect to the cause not being in things themselves, or in any qualities of them, but necessarily in us, consequently, and in qualities (categories) of us. Whatever change there may be in the words, this one proposition seems to recur ever again, in unchanged identity: that necessity *cannot* be in things of sense, but *must* be in categories of the intellect. The jaded reader, confused and desperate, can only mutter to himself, “And so *must be* because *must be*.” But, even without denying the necessity of the category, are we not to ask, when the category of causality makes choice

of certain sensations for its action — are we not to ask after the grounds of its choice, and if we find these grounds to lie in a *sensuous* rule prescriptive of which sensation shall be irreversibly first, and which irreversibly second, shall we not say, Here in this rule is already all the necessity that is wanted; your laborious *a priori* contrivances are all useless, and if anything is to be explained, explain to us, first of all, if you please, this first rule itself? Of course, Kant replies, Do you not see that what you call the *sensuous*, and I the *subjective*, rule can not contain necessity, but must be followed by an *objective* rule which *does*? We know — we may suppose him to continue — not things in themselves, but only the affections they occasion in us; and if you are ever to reduce such mere ghost-world to law, order, and objectivity, you must receive it into a necessary time and space of your own, presided over by necessary notions of your own. But the rejoinder is prompt: We know an actual outer space, an actual outer time, and actual outer objects, all of which are not as you say, but are things themselves, and very fairly perceived by us in their own qualities; it is, in fact, *their* necessity we see, and not any necessity in us — call it subjective, objective, or how you please.

But if this be the nature of the section as a whole, the particular paragraph quoted by Schopenhauer has, as said, an unsatisfactoriness of its own. It states (what *virtually*, of course, amounts to the “two judgments”) that, in the first instance, the order in a sensational multiple is indifferent, but that, in the second instance, when received into the *a priori* machinery, it is necessary.² Otherwise, says Kant, there would be a mere sport of my own subjective fancies, and any assumption of objectivity would be no better than a dream. Consequently, he adds, there *must* be an *a priori* which prescribes conditions and rules to the *a posteriori* (of sensation); and causality belongs to it. This is what we

² That, of course, is the one flaw: it is not the case, and, even for the action of the category, cannot be the case, that in *causality* the order of the “sensational multiple” is “indifferent.”

have seen already: the two main assumptions of Kant (as derived from Hume), and his own inference from them. As thus: 1. We only perceive our own subjective affections. 2. Subjective affections are only contingent. 3. The necessity, consequently, that appears in them, and is required for them, has an *a priori* source. The reasoning, as we have seen before, is that, as this is so and that is so, such and such must be, simply because it must be; it utterly breaks up and vanishes, of course, the moment it is shown that neither this nor that *is* so. This, however, is not what Schopenhauer sees here. On the contrary, he takes up the whole passage in a wrong sense—a sense which he would never have dreamed of imputing to Kant, had he not completely missed Kant's general conception. That general conception is simply this: Sensations only exhibit subjectivity; accordingly, as required, the categories—all the categories—shall bestow on them objectivity. Schopenhauer has actually read that passage of Kant as if it declared all objectivity to be bestowed *by the single category of causality alone*—a blunder that, surely, would be astounding in even a first-year's student of Kant! In the particular paragraph, Kant, of course, has no thought but of causality and causal multiples; he has not the most distant conception of enunciating it as a general rule for all sense-multiples that they can get objectivity only from causality. He firmly believes at this moment, we may say, that his reader knows perfectly now—knows nothing more perfectly now—than that *all* the categories are there for no other purpose than to infuse necessity into the contingency of sense; and he would have been completely astounded and confounded by his reader lifting his face to say: So, all objectivity is given by causality alone. *Lieber Gott!* he would have thought to himself, what *is* quantity there for, or quality there for, or substance there for, or modality there for? Is not every one of them wholly and solely there for no other purpose than to produce objectivity? It is really marvellous that Schopenhauer should have fallen into a blunder so egregious as this. But not content, even yet, he adds another—which, as being ludicrous, is worse. He actually supposes

Kant to hold that, in all syntheses except the causal one, *we* can *make* the members follow in what order *we* please. This is what he understands Kant to mean by the subjectivity of a series, none such being objective but the causal one. Any quantitative series — a row of bricks, a file of soldiers, herrings on a spit, strung beads or strung counters in the school-machine, set chess-men on the chess-board, or draughts on the draught-board — can be counted in different directions *without* displacement of the individuals. It was exactly in this way Kant regarded the various series in the faces of a house; he never dreamed that it would be supposed he called these series subjective, and merely under control of his own good-will and pleasure. Even had they been subjective, no such control would necessarily have belonged to him; but they were not subjective. A stable house was as objective to Kant as a drifting ship — only, for a beginning in surveying the house, he was not bound, as he was bound in surveying (causally, not quantitatively) the successive positions of the ship. The quantitative series of the house he could count along or across, up or down; the causal chain of the ship's movements he could only count down — without, of course, in either case, any power to displace a unit. Schopenhauer has no authority from Kant to apply the word “*Willkühr*” in regard to our supposed control over what is subjective; nay, in the passage referred to by Schopenhauer (as regards the house), I do not even find the word “*beliebig*.” (See paragraphs 3 and 4 of the *second analogy*.) Still this latter word *might* have been used without error. I *can* count series in the faces of a house in any *discretionary* order. I cannot displace these series, however; they are not there *at will* of mine. Schopenhauer has altogether wrong notions of subjectivity and objectivity. What is *sensible*, *empirical*, *actual*, seems to be wholly his idea of what is objective; while phantasmata at will in imagination loom to him as all that is subjective. Such a blunder in Kant's regard is simply boyish. What is only *sensible* is subjective to Kant; and so far as we can say empirical or actual of anything that has not yet undergone action of a category, such empirical and such actual are also subjective. Nothing

is objective to Kant that is without necessity. What is subjective, again, though necessarily only affection, is not by any means necessarily at will. Schopenhauer, again and again, commits the implied misreadings of Kant.

The reader must understand that what is given above as the gist of the relative passage from Kant has been executed from the text itself, without reference to the rendering of Schopenhauer, and that he may depend upon it as accurate. The imperfections of the passage have been allowed ; but what it says is this : That *a posteriori* elements being all subjective and contingent, they can and must procure objectivity and necessity only from our own *a priori* categories, of which causality is one. Schopenhauer's rendering, on the other hand—and it constitutes his “objection” to causality in Kant—is that Kant holds the category of causality *alone* to be the minister of objectivity !

Schopenhauer's first words in interpretation of the text which, summarized from Kant, underlies the challenge before us, are perfectly correct. “The order of the succession of the changes of real objects shall be perceived to be an objective one only first of all by virtue of the causality of these.” That is the true and genuine Kant. About the end of the middle third of the “refutation,” too, we have similar correct words : “Only through means of causality do we perceive the objective succession of changes.” But what gives the correctness is, that “succession,” in these two sentences, is limited to one of “*changes*.” Elsewhere the statement, when it occurs to be made, is generally made without any such (accidental) guard ; and implies, consequently, that those successions of sensible impressions which have undergone causality are alone objective, and that all other successions of sensible impressions—as, those of a house—are subjective. That is the main understanding of Schopenhauer in reference to Kant's process of objectivity ; and that is what Schopenhauer, in the same reference, believes he has mainly to fight. All the categories being ministers of objectivity, and nothing but such ministers, it is an extraordinary mistake, especially in a passed Kantian expert, to attribute objectivity to causality alone. But all Schopen-

hauer's subsequent words express such mistake, quite openly, directly, and unmisgivingly.

The allegation that follows is this: "*Kant explains objectivity to be agreement of the succession of impressions with the succession of real objects.*" So far as it is intended to mean that agreement with sensible objects conditions the objectivity of our impressions, this is peculiarly objectionable. It represents a leading mistake of Schopenhauer's: that objectivity, namely, means only empirical perception. For objectivity, it seems enough to Schopenhauer to point to real objects, actual objects, sensible objects, empirical objects — as if the *fact* of such sufficed, without question of their constitution or genesis. But it is this question is Kant's whole business; and objectivity means, with him, *necessity*. Of course, wherever this necessity appears, it is in consequence of a category *curdling*, so to speak, subjective impressions into objectivity (in the usual sense), in time and space. Schopenhauer does not well follow all this; thinks Kant attributes objectivity to causality alone; and, in considerable disconcertion, ventures to talk loudly of other "actual" objects. Of course, the sentence will be quite correct if by "real objects" there be understood (with Kant) objects that have already undergone a category; but that is no understanding of Schopenhauer's. Neither does the completion of the sentence, "that this objectivity [this agreement, that is] is *perceived* only through the law of causality," at all help matters. The next sentence, too, only makes peculiarly glaring the false ascription to Kant in regard to causality. Schopenhauer has only misread a confused sentence of Kant's (the fourth of the original paragraph cited), and taken it to be general, whereas it was only special. Leaving what concerns subjective impressions a moment, we pass now to the *house* and the *ship*.

All that Kant means by these is this: In the object *house* (not my subject), I can take its constitutive multiple, its parts, in any direction, in any order,—begin and end in whatever direction or order I please. As regards the multiple of the phenomena connected with the *ship*, again, the facts are otherwise. There the order (as to where the beginning is to

be put) is not indifferent, but necessary and fixed. The conclusion is that, while it is the category quantity has made (out of the impressions), the object house, it is that of causality has functioned in the case of the ship. Kant, perhaps, does not mention quantity, but no intelligent reader requires that it should be mentioned. Very certainly, however, Kant, although he dwells on the indifferent order in the multiple of the house, never calls it "*subjective*." The house, as a house, has already undergone the action of quantity, and the multiple, in its case, is no longer subjective. All that Kant wants to illustrate is, in multiples, the different order under different categories, and he has no idea of calling the one subjective and the other objective. It would precisely stultify him, he knows, to do so. There is no question here of the *subjective judgment* and the *objective judgment*, which *two* judgments precede or fall under every *one* category. That is a distinction, as I have said, that becomes prominent in the "*Prolegomena*;" and no one need, to his own confusion, refer to it in connection with Schopenhauer, for Schopenhauer, as I believe, never consciously or unconsciously had this distinction of judgments in his mind. No; Schopenhauer has no idea of the processes here but this simple one: that Kant affirms the induction or introduction of objectivity into subjectivity to be due to one category alone—the category of causality. It is this alone he combats. The very mode of his combat shows the grossness of his mistake. To Kant, the multiple connected with the house is quite as objective as the multiple connected with the ship; but that he attributes to the category of quantity, and not, laboriously and supervacaneously, like Schopenhauer, to the various causal relations of the eye in movement. That is a particularly acute device of Schopenhauer—Kant never could have denied that! He never *would* have denied it. It is quite certain that the eye and the house may be so mutually regarded; but any such consideration is quite beside the distinction Kant would demonstrate between the order in multiples under quantity, and the order in multiples under causality. But Schopenhauer is quite innocent; he is sure that the house, as also every-

thing else *actual*, is objective, and an object; and, turning the tables on Kant, he will demonstrate as much by application of Kant's own scale! "Both cases" are "occurrences" — that he will "maintain." That any man should attempt to criticise Kant in such profound ignorance of all that was cardinal and characteristic in Kant! Surely it is beyond even a *tyro* in the study to believe nothing "objective" to Kant that was not an "occurrence." Schopenhauer means no more (by his whole section) than that the house series is as objective as the ship series — that it is not subjective; how it would have surprised him to have been answered by an instant, if somewhat astonished, "Of course!" Both series are subjective affections, struck into objectivity, in time and space, by categories. But the category that functions in the one case is not the category that functions in the other. The one is quantity, and the other is causality. And that means that, in the one series, you can take its terms indifferently first and second; but, in the other, you can take them only necessarily first and second. Or here the terms follow *from* one another; while there they follow *on* one another. But though all this was so to Kant, he would certainly have acknowledged the movement of the eye to be an occurrence! On the whole, Schopenhauer's misapprehension and perversion of the very elements, rudiments, and A B C of Kant's doctrine, here and elsewhere, is scarcely credible.

Schopenhauer's first sentence in report of Kant is: "The synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination, that is required for every empirical perception — this synthesis gives succession, but not yet any determinate one; that is to say, it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior, not only in my imagination, but in the object." Kant's own words are these: "To all empirical perception there belongs the synthesis of the many of particulars through imagination, which is always successive; that is, the impressions in it always follow one another. The sequence, however, is, in imagination, as regards order (what *must* precede and what *must* follow), not at all determined, and the series of the units of the sequent impressions may be taken just as well

backwards as forwards." Kant then goes on to say that if such *order* is to be *determined* as that of an antecedent that precedes, and a consequent that follows from it ("an order," says Kant, "according to which something must necessarily precede, and when this is given, the other must necessarily follow"), this can only take place on action of the category of cause and effect. Kant has no thought here of the objective series of units that follow *on* one another; he addresses himself only to the series of units that follow *from* one another. His expressions are confused and imperfect, but that is really the import he means them to carry. He never dreams of declaring all sequence in imagination subjective till the one category of causality has acted; though his doctrine certainly is that all such sequence — however "sensibly," "empirically," or "actually" introduced — *is* subjective till *a* category, any one of the twelve, has acted. Schopenhauer represents Kant as saying "it leaves undetermined which of two perceived states *is* the prior;" but the actual expression is, "*must*" be the prior. Kant had no difficulty with the *is*; he knew impressions could come to him only in their own "actual" series, and these series he could *not* put otherwise; but that did not make them objective. It was the category made them objective, the category that was brought into play as in agreement with the special series of actual impressions — that is, these series were themselves different, and demanded different categories to suit. Some series, for example, might be regarded in any order; others, only in one.

But besides the capital mistake of Schopenhauer, another emerges here which (already referred to) is scarcely less glaring. It is that the synthesis "leaves undetermined which of two perceived states is the prior," even "in my imagination." Impressions in my imagination, so long as they are subjective, shall be at command of my own will — to be set here or set there, like pebbles on the beach, just as I please! But there is no such absurd doctrine as that in Kant, who knows, as everybody knows, that our imagination, be its power of action what it may, is passive to the order of its *impressions*, and cannot but be passive. Kant is, really, as

much subdued to "actuality" as Schopenhauer, or anybody else. One would like to absolve Schopenhauer here, but we fear the facts will not allow us. For example, "the succession of the perceptions of the parts of the house" are spoken of as "depending on one's own will;" one "might cause them to proceed in quite a reverse order." But Kant, when he said he could count or survey the various series of units in the surfaces of a house in what order he pleased, never meant it to be supposed that he had these series or surfaces under his own control—that he could actually dispose these series or surfaces in his imagination under whatever modifications it occurred to him to make. "The result of Kant's allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us *is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will.*" There we have the two errors—both unmistakable. "Subjective—dependent on my own will;" "subjectively—by my own will." There are other such expressions, but a single illustration of Schopenhauer's will, perhaps, be definitive here. It is the illustration of the tile. "I step out of doors," he says, "and a tile, falling from the roof, hits me; there is no causal connection between my stepping out and this falling of the tile; nevertheless, the succession, namely that my movement preceded that of the tile, is objectively determined in my apprehension, and not subjectively by my own will, which otherwise, indeed, *would, rather, have reversed the succession.*" Here we see again both mistakes. But as regards the latter of them, had he possessed the power, he says, which Kant attributes to him, he would have escaped the blow of the tile, for, naturally, *he would have made it fall first!* This needs nothing to confirm it, but it throws light on what may be further illustrative. In his endeavor to equalize house series and ship series, Schopenhauer says the latter would have been quite as the former, had we "only possessed the power to draw the ship up stream." That is an odd thing to say, but could he ever have thought of it, if the supposed pliancy of impressions in the imagination had not been vividly before his mind?

It is quite in consequence of similar conceptions that Schopenhauer feels doubt as to how Kant places himself in the empirical world. "Neither would Kant, in the case adduced by him, have believed himself to find a difficulty, had he reflected that his body is an object among objects, and that the succession of his empirical perceptions depends on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body, and is, consequently, an objective one — can very well be perceived without the successive objects that impress his body standing together in a causal connection." That sentence is absolutely frightful. Kant never reflected that his body was an object among objects ; had he done so, he would have been in a moment aware of an infinity of objects beside him, but not in any causal connection ! Was Kant, to Schopenhauer, merely a fool, then ? And in what a silly sense it is that objects are objects to Schopenhauer ! "Don't you see that the contents of the empirical world are objects ?" he says. "Ah, yes ; so they are," replies Kant, with a smile, "*once they are formed.*" Nay, is the reader prepared to hear that this Schopenhauer, who so takes up Kant for his supposed exclusive causality, has himself no instrument of objectivity whatever but this same causality ? His whole theory of perception is that we know only our own subjective states, but that these are thrown as objects into time and space solely by the action of causality. Absolutely, that is all. That is, very fairly, the whole philosophy of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer has causality for his single weapon — he limits himself so ; and because of this same limitation (but only imputed by himself) he would pillory Kant, who has actually eleven others ! By and by Schopenhauer objects the brain to Kant, as if this latter, ignorant of his own body, was equally ignorant of physiology and the nervous system ! When Kant mentions *connection in subjection to rule as the principle of objective reality*, Schopenhauer exclaims, "But of how few impressions do we know the place given to them in the causal series by the causal law ; and yet we can always distinguish the objective ones from the subjective ones, real objects from phantasmata." Again, he says : "Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize

the actuality of the succession merely from its *necessity*; this, however, would presuppose an understanding that embraced all the series of causes and effects at once—that is, an omniscient understanding.” These two passages are really based on similar considerations with those that refer to the body and the brain. It is an objecting of empirical fact in what we may call its secondary laws. Actuality signifying objectivity, it is quite true that Kant recognizes actuality only from necessity—meaning not only causal necessity, however, but categorical necessity in general. All our colors and other feelings become objects in time and space through the categories, says Kant. All our colors and other feelings become objects in time and space through the category of causality, asseverates Schopenhauer.³ One wonders how, in any sense or in any application, the latter should think the advantage to lie with him. Kant holds that he can know the *a posteriori* necessity only by possessing, first of all, an *a priori* necessity; and he cannot imagine any prejudice to result to the independence of the former secondarily, in consequence of being preceded by the latter. The laws of physics are not necessarily non-existent because of the laws of metaphysics. He cannot see that, though the latter prescribe *form*, it is any contradiction that the former should prescribe *matter*. Though the causal law is *a priori*, he says, knowledge of the causal process is not *a priori*. No; “to that there is required the cognition of *actual forces*, which can only *empirically* be given.” We may

³ That proposition, Schopenhauer's own, his whole philosophy, falsely ascribed to Kant, is Schopenhauer's object of special reprobation in Kant! For, of course, colors and other feelings are successions; and what Schopenhauer specially condemns is the proposition (falsely called Kantian) that successions become objective through causality *alone*. Really, that is the single proposition of Schopenhauer himself—impressions become objects in time and space only through causality! It is but fair to point out that, in Schopenhauer, the causality is only the reference by us of the subjective impression to its own self as causal object; whereas, in Kant, the necessity considered is that among the impressions themselves in their own series. That is Kant's one (relative) problem, which one almost doubts Schopenhauer ever to have seen. And yet, when he gives his views of succession, he says: “The necessity of a succession of *two states* [in the object, namely—not in my subject]—that is, of a *change*—we cognize only by understanding, through causality.”

think, says Schopenhauer, "of the law of gravitation some day ceasing to operate, but not of this taking place without a cause." In what way shall we say that Schopenhauer differs from Kant in such references? Passing over that Schopenhauer is, in regard to an exclusive causality, alone the sinner he would make Kant, surely they both talk of the empirical world as conditioned by the *a priori* world, though perfectly cognizant, both, of the independence of the former on its own side. Surely, too, they both—Kant always, Schopenhauer when thetic—view the *a posteriori* as not only subjective, but contingent, and the *a priori* as the source of objectivity and necessity. Yet Schopenhauer objects to Kant that, to know the necessity of the *a priori*, he would require to be, a *posteriori*, omniscient! How of his own knowledge in the case of causality, and in the case of gravitation? But, returning, it would have made no difference to Kant, as regards the house and the ship, had he reflected that his body was an object among objects. It is precisely in that state of mind, indeed, and precisely from that position, that he makes the illustrations. Still, though his body was an object among objects, he was quite unable to perceive that "the succession of his empirical perceptions," depending "on the succession of the impressions of other objects on his body," was, "therefore," an objective one. It was precisely because that *therefore* did not, and could not, in that manner, exist, that he was led to inquire at all; and the result of his inquiry was to establish it on quite another basis. Kant is quite at home—no plowman more so—in that empirical world, *once it is formed*. But *how* it is formed, that is his single trouble; how contingent subjective sensations can become necessary objective perceptions. Schopenhauer seems positively to overlook the very problem in point, and to tell Kant the impressions themselves are all the objectivity he need seek. And, for that matter, indeed, Kant is much more under the authority of the actual than Schopenhauer himself, who objects the want to him. It was precisely because, from *its* nature, he could *not* draw the ship up stream, and precisely because, from *its* nature, he *could* see the house in any way, that he applied one category

there and another here ; he (Kant) would never have thought of “ *only* ” the power to “ draw the ship up stream ! ”

The remark of Kant that is taken next, in regard to time itself not being perceived, is also mistaken by Schopenhauer. Kant's words occur in the second paragraph of the *second analogy*. Like most others in this place, they are not exact. Still, they mean that, if we saw a thing in itself, that thing would impose on us all that we saw, and consequently that, if time were such thing, and no mere show of sense, we should be compelled to accept all facts in it at its own simple dictation. All is otherwise, however, on the other alternative, and all empirical multiples in time are only contingent and subjective till acted on by a category. From these facts Schopenhauer's inference is : “ Therefore, no succession of impressions can be empirically perceived as objective — that is to say, as alterations of the sensible phenomena in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions. The objectivity of an alteration can be cognized only through the law of causality, which is a rule in accordance with which states follow each other. And the result of his allegation would be that we perceive as objective no sequence in time whatever, except that of cause and effect, and that every other sequence of sensible phenomena perceived by us is determined thus, and not otherwise, only by our own will.” The main and accessory errors here have been already signalized ; and these errors *are* here, notwithstanding the *verbal* correctness of the phrase “ the objectivity of an *alteration*,” etc. — an accidental guard which has been previously noticed. I would only point out that it is very absurd to suppose Kant not to admit “ alterations of sensible phenomena ” while as yet subjective, and, so to speak, crude. The phenomena of both house and ship, even while as yet without category, alter to Kant “ sensibly,” according to their own conditions, and independent of him. All manner of lights, shades, colors, may “ sensibly ” alter on the retina, long before we have made objective perceptions of them. So of the other senses. The enormity of Schopenhauer's error is made peculiarly glaring by the subsequent words : “ The sequence of events in time can certainly, *though denied by*

Kant, as cited! be empirically cognized, just as well as the side-by-side of things in space.” Of course, it is from the position of Kant that we talk of anything “sensible” being still “subjective.” Schopenhauer, who knows only his own subjective states, ought, in consistency, to be as Kant. On the contrary, as we see here, for anything to be objective, it is enough for him if it is only sensible: “Objective — that is to say, alterations of sensible phenomena in distinction from alterations of mere subjective impressions!”

But Schopenhauer, for his part, “must allege against all that” the fact “that sensible phenomena may very well follow *on* one another without following *from* one another!” Why, does not Kant *say* the sensible phenomena of the house follow *on* one another without following *from* one another? More than that — this blunder of Schopenhauer’s is so very gross! — is not Kant always aware that what his twelve categories subsume may be very well named just *so many* different successions, *all* of which, when subsumed, are *objective*? Schopenhauer makes considerable play with the distinction of following *on* and following *from*. Hume, he says, made all following only a following *on*; Kant, *ex contrario*, made all following only a following *from*; and both were wrong! This, however, is true neither of the one nor the other; and only Schopenhauer is wrong. The truth has just been said as regards Kant; and of Hume, it is easy to know that he acknowledged following *from* to be the cardinal principle of reason itself, though unable to refer its *origin* to anything but instinct *naturally*, or anything but custom *philosophically*.

The illustration from the musical notes, which we have next, is good in itself, but, as it is now superfluous to say, inapplicable to Kant. As for that of day and night, it is wholly inept. So little is it inept to Schopenhauer himself, nevertheless, that he even seems exultingly to say it does to death both Kant and Hume. I observe Mr. Caird, also, seems to accept the illustration from Schopenhauer, and to regard it as, at least, of some value. It belongs to Reid, though, and is no property of Schopenhauer’s. Reid says (Works, p. 627): “It follows, from this definition of a cause, that night

is the cause of day, and day the cause of night. For no two things have more constantly followed each other since the beginning of the world." But, despite Reid, it is, as said, only inept. How terrible soever it may be thought, I have no hesitation in affirming that it would hardly have drawn a glance from either Kant or Hume. To object a mere alternation of an indifferent first and an indifferent second, that had each its sufficient reason in a common third something — to object such mere alternation to either Kant or Hume — is wholly to misunderstand both. Kant's first words under the *third analogy (reciprocity)* are these: "Things are at the same time, or together, if, in the empirical perception, the apprehension of the one can reciprocally follow on the apprehension of the other (which, in the case of causality, is impossible). Thus, I may carry my observation first to the moon and afterwards to the earth; or, reversewise, also, I may carry it first to the earth and then to the moon; and, just because of this — just because the perceptions of these objects may reciprocally follow each other, I say they exist at the same time, or together." In the alternation of day and night, these do not, indeed, exist *together*, as the moon and the earth do (yet, absolutely, they are always only side by side), still it is impossible to make of their succession an irreversible A B, for, even to Reid, B A is equally tenable; and, without such irreversible succession, it is impossible that the category of causality should act — a consideration which (however fatal to Kant's scheme for procuring a necessity which the scheme itself already presupposes) effectually defends him from the objection in review. How much Schopenhauer is submitted to the one strange error comes well forward here, also. "Nay, even the succession of day and night is, beyond doubt, objectively perceived by us, but they are certainly not apprehended as cause and effect, the one of the other." From these words it is again made plain to us that, to Schopenhauer's belief, Kant held there could be no *objective perception* except under the relation of cause and effect. What extraordinary delusion! Kant had never the faintest idea of the relation of cause and effect in connection with the succession of day and night, and yet, very certainly,

that succession was to him, also, "objectively perceived." Causality apart, had not Kant actually eleven other agents of objectivity?

The immediately following words but bespeak the same blunder: We distinguish objective perceptions from mere subjective phantasmata, in many cases, he says, where causality is not in place. Kant, of course, though with more consistent ideas as to the relative distinction, would have only cried to that, "I should think so." He would also have quite agreed with the quotations from Leibnitz; thinking, at the same time, of a good many other sources of *liaison* (or "rule") besides causality, and wondering, perhaps, at the slowness to the ordinary distinction between reality and dream.

Kant, as we have seen, reasons always in this way: Sense is, and can be, only contingent; there must be categories. But again, there is necessity in sense; consequently, categories *are*. Schopenhauer, for his part, as we know, too, has only one category—causality; and his reasoning in its regard simply is that we attribute apodeictic validity to the law of causality because we find we must. There is certainly analogy between the reasonings, so far as the fulcrum in each seems *must be* because *must be*. Still, we wonder what grounds Schopenhauer can find in this for proceeding to fling at Kant the reproach of an "extremely surprising and palpable error." Kant's proof (from necessity) is at least much more feasible and full than his own.

Schopenhauer, very properly, ascribes following *from* to the understanding, and following *on* to sense; but the distinction is Kant's own. It is the product of the very *Transcendental Reflection* by which Kant would, in correcting Leibnitz, refer him to the *Transcendental Topik*, where sense and intellect are assigned each its place. Leibnitz conceived time and space as *intellectual* results of the conditions and actions of things themselves. If things acted so and so on one another, he thought, then, the conceptions of space and time, or of things in space and time, were but logical consequences. Plainly, then, Kant's reproach was true—that Leibnitz "intellectualized" what were only "forms of sense;"

for time and space are perceptions, and not mere conceptions. Kant's action, on the other hand, is different. With him, intellect certainly enters into perception; but it does so only in its own quality. It simply gives focus, as it were, to the nebula of mere sense. Rather, then, Kant's act might be called, not an intellectualizing of sense, but a sensualizing of intellect. Even that, as a reproach, however, would be quite unjust. Plato already, in the "Theætetus," showed how intellect was necessary to sensation in order to make perception of it; and all modern theories about the acquired perceptions of sense concern nothing else. In point of fact, there is no man more open to complicated reproaches of this kind than Schopenhauer himself; who, with what theory he advocates, can only, and does only, convert sensation into perception by an intellectualizing (rather, as explained, sensualizing) use of the single category of causality. And this, certainly, is strange; Schopenhauer is the single person in this world who "intellectualizes the forms of sense" (rather, "as explained," etc.) by "the clue of causality," and he makes it a reproach to Kant! Of course, this reproach, though but another sample of the main blunder, would have had a certain relevance, had Schopenhauer said "clue," not of causality, but of *all* the categories. It is not the fact, either, as we have already seen, that Kant "denies" the "sequence of events in time" to be "empirically cognized." Kant's action is simply to supply necessity to the empirically cognized sequence of events in time. He tells us, again and again, that the sequence of the shining of the sun and the warming of the stone is empirically cognized (but, of course, only subjectively), even before action of the category.

When Schopenhauer says, further, "*how* something follows on another in time generally, as little admits of explanation as how something follows *from* another; that cognition is given and conditioned by pure sense, as this by pure understanding," we recognize again only Kant's own *Topik*, and are surprised it should be introduced as a principle from elsewhere for — the correction of Kant. It is beyond doubt, also, that Schopenhauer, in the sentence quoted, does not more certainly

characterize sense and understanding as, so to speak, *quarries*, each absolutely *sui generis*, and each simply inexplicable, than Kant himself does. Kant accepts understanding at the hands of ordinary school-logic without a question, and he similarly accepts from sense, not only its inexplicable, general *a priori* forms, but its equally inexplicable, endless *a posteriori* matter. In neither respect is there any attempt at deduction on the part of Kant. Certain materials being given us, he only attempts to show in what manner they are wrought up. He knows nothing of their *whence*, nor asks. Ignorance in that respect is a *discrimen* proper and peculiar of the very position of Kant. Schopenhauer, as we have seen above, though opposing Kant, only makes the same avowal. But what was consistent in Kant is, again, inconsistent in Schopenhauer; for the latter, unlike the former, is understood to *deduce* the universe. We conceive of Schopenhauer, even from the outside, that, being allowed the bare fact of will, he is able, methodically and step by step, to derive from it all the other infinite contents of the whole huge universe, the *a-priori* unities of the understanding, and the *a-posteriori* multiplicities of special sense as well. It at once chills and disappoints us, then, to hear Schopenhauer so soon speaking of sense and understanding, which together *are* the world, as both inexplicable, and we wonder *what* it can be he demonstrates out of will.

Schopenhauer proceeds now to a formal statement of his views on succession. They are as follows: 1. From the form belonging to pure sense — time — we derive our knowledge of the mere possibility of succession. 2. The succession of real objects we cognize empirically, and, consequently, as actual. 3. The *necessity* in a change we cognize only by the understanding through causality. 4. That we do cognize this necessity is the proof that causality is *a priori*, and not empirical. 5. All our objects are subjective states of our own. 6. Connection among these is bestowed wholly by the principle of sufficient reason. 7. This principle is basal form of necessary connection, lying in the innermost of our cognitive faculty. 8. This principle is the common form of all our objects. 9. It

is the sole source of the notion of necessity. 10. That, the antecedent being given, the consequent appears — this is the very meaning and authentication of this notion of necessity. 11. Time is the form of the objects in which the principle of sufficient reason becomes the law of causality. 12. The time-sequence of these objects is determined by this principle or law. 13. Hence, connection here takes on the shape of a rule of succession.

One wonders when one reads these propositions. Inconsistency seems the burden of every one of them — inconsistency as regards Schopenhauer with Kant; inconsistency as regards Schopenhauer with his own self. The first two propositions — the correction in regard to “actual” being borne in mind — are literally Kant’s own. Then, (3) that we cognize necessary connection in the relation of cause and effect’ only through a law of causality, that lies in the understanding — if that proposition is not Kant’s, what proposition is? It is, in brief, Kant’s answer to Hume. Only Kant does not think it enough to state it, he must reason it as well. Accordingly, he is at pains to demonstrate — in connection with the subjectivity of impression and the *apriority* of time and space — the fact of the understanding being constituted by an organic system of functions (categories), each of which (causality included) is, through imagination, combined with time into an *a priori schema* or frame-work for reception (with regulation and consolidation) of the contributions of special sense. That is a full, general statement of Kant’s one object; and, though I hold it to be, on the whole, unreal, and a superfetation merely, surely, in its amplitude both of purpose and plan it contrasts very strangely with the simple assertion of Schopenhauer; which, nevertheless, is meant by him utterly to subvert it! It is enough to Schopenhauer that the causality of his own understanding refers his own subjective impressions to their own selves as their own causes. That is to him an act of perception. Functions of the understanding, *schemata* of the imagination — all of them he will explode. He retains only one function of the understanding — causality; but, simply appending to it the word “intui-

tive," he feels himself thereby authorized to lecture Kant — severely — on the absurdity of introducing elements of reflection into the sensuous act of perception. Nor does it at all appear inconsistent to him, immediately thereafter, and in the same connection, to bring in himself all those *reflections* with respect to position, relative distinctness, organic movements in the eye, etc., which, constituting what are called the acquired perceptions of sense, are so current and common nowadays with the psychologists of every country!⁴ So little, indeed, has he made himself at home with what is central in Kant — the theory of perception, namely — that in the section preceding this "refutation" (p. 80) he has these words, which, as quite inapplicable, are utterly unintelligible: "Perception, with Kant, is something quite immediate, and takes place without any assistance from the causal nexus, and, consequently, from the understanding; he directly identifies it with sensation!" Forgetting how much he himself, but a moment ago, demonstrated the power of reflection in perception, he would hold causality, with Kant, as being but an affair of notions and reflection (not even *called* "intuitive"), to have no application to sense. He says, also, in the same place (p. 81), that Kant puts causality only in connection with the thing in itself, and so "Kant, then, must leave quite unexplained the origin of empirical perception; with him, as given by a miracle, it is a mere affair of sense — coincides, therefore, with sensation!" One can only hold one's hands up. Is this the Schopenhauer who, as a Kantian expert, was deferred to even by a Rosenkranz? 4. The necessity of causality is the proof of its being a *priori*. Here again, what is mere assertion with Schopenhauer has, with Kant, at least the light of rational references. Schopenhauer, too, who, when with only his own materials before him, attributes the conversion of subjectivity into objectivity to causality alone, urges everywhere, with all his might, as

⁴ His whole position, indeed, as regards perception, is, in effect, that of the realist; and it is impossible to reconcile it with that of the subjective idealist, for whom, to say nothing of the unreality of time and space, there do not exist even the things in themselves which existed for Kant.

against the materials of Kant, that to conceive objectivity dependent on causality alone, is manifest absurdity! 5. The subjectivity of all our sense-objects is also, of course, a proposition signally Kantian. Schopenhauer himself calls the distinction involved, Kant's "greatest merit." By all true philosophy, however, it ought, very specially, to be denied. 6. Sufficient reason is alone the principle of connection. Causality being with Schopenhauer one of four, is with Kant one of twelve. Guarded so, the proposition may be passed as Kantian. With the same guard where necessary, propositions 7, 8, and 9 may be similarly passed. 10. Necessity, with Kant, means twelve categories, and not one only; consequently the appearance of the consequent on the given antecedent is not Kant's *sole* authentication of necessity. Nevertheless, causality being alone in view, the proposition may be esteemed Kant's. But it is necessary to remark that, so far as it is only succession that is in reference, all Schopenhauer's objections in such reference come back on himself. We have also to point out to both Kant and Schopenhauer that, if necessity here means only, and is alone authenticated by, the appearance of B on the appearance of A, then the whole question depends on *the peculiar nature* of A B — or, what is the same thing, on A B being, not a mere succession, but a change. This is the vital point of view, but it is not entertained by either. Kant, indeed, has his subjective judgment to represent it; but here in Schopenhauer, the *names* apart (antecedent and consequent), there seems to be consideration only of one appearance after another in time. That, as said, ought to bring Schopenhauer down on his own self. It reminds us of what we shall presently see, that Schopenhauer, erroneously conceiving Kant to make the mere order in time a criterion of the causal action, is particularly loud in disapprobation. Here, however, he seems to say the mere fact of A being followed by B is the sufficient proof and guarantee of the necessity of the relation. "The notion of necessity has absolutely no other true meaning or authentication than that of the appearance of the one when the other is given." Elsewhere, too, he seems to attribute to the time-order itself

some portion of the causal efficacy. One moment, he says, is parent of the other. Propositions 11, 12, and 13 may be passed pretty well without comment. We shall not even object that — some of the last averments being contrasted — time would seem now to determine causality, and again, causality time ; but, in a concluding reference to these deliverances on succession, we must decidedly accentuate this that, as the entire scheme of Schopenhauer but repeats, so far, the scheme of Kant, one is minded to look back with more than surprise on the so-called “ refutation.”

But, to pass further, the sentence that follows is this : “ Were the controverted allegation of Kant correct, we should recognize the *actuality* of the succession merely from its *necessity*.” It is difficult to see how Kant’s machinery can be open to that charge. The succession in Kant, so far as it is *actual*, is supposed to be recognized only as matter of special sense, disposed in the *a priori* sense-forms. It is so, also, that, as we have just seen, it is regarded in the scheme of Schopenhauer. Then, according to both, it is the understanding that, through its law of causality, adds *necessity*. Kant, no more than his critic, needs an “ understanding omniscient of the whole series of causes and effects at once.” It is enough for Kant that he has, in the *a priori* forms (space and time), an *a priori* matter such that the law of causality subsumes it. There is no reason for objecting to Kant, when occupied in forming the world, the series of empirical causes in the world, once it is formed. These depend on the contributions of special sense, for which we have to wait. One wonders why Schopenhauer should object to Kant here, any more than to himself. One gets to think, indeed, that Schopenhauer is more bent on objecting for the sake of objecting, than on looking to the truth of the case, even in relation to himself. Consider his almost sneering severity to Kant for introducing into the act of perception forms of reflection ! Such forms constitute for all philosophers the special instruments for the conversion of sensation into perception. As we have seen, Schopenhauer is quite as others here — only he forgets his adoption of the rationale of the acquired perceptions, and he arbitrarily *names*

causality, as used by himself, "intuitive." As for Kant, he is perfectly consistent; he says (Prol., p. 45): "All our perception takes place only by means of the senses; the understanding perceives not, it reflects only." Of course, Kant's whole categorical scheme is *for* perception, is there to give sensation *focus*; but it is still understanding, not sense. It is precisely Schopenhauer himself makes the understanding perceptive ("intuitive"). A moment ago, too, the same Schopenhauer blamed Kant for identifying perception with sense!

What Kant is employed on in the next reference is that, despite the apparent contemporaneousness of certain effects and causes — as, heat in the room and in the fire, the dint in the cushion, and the bullet on it — the cause is always "dynamically" first. "Accordingly," says Kant, but with only this in his mind, "the time-sequence is certainly the only *empirical* criterion of the effect in relation to the cause" — that is, taking any actual case of causality, you distinguish the effect from the cause, empirically, by its relative place in time. But "mere *succession*" (following *on*) is "the empirical criterion of which of two states is cause and which effect." This is what Schopenhauer makes of it, and he cannot reconcile it with the other "allegation, that objectivity of succession is alone known from the necessity of the sequence of effect on cause!" "Who but sees here," he adds, "the most evident circle?" Accordingly, the statement of his next paragraph is one of astonishment, that, with Kant, following *on* should now be equal to following *from*, and Hume, by his very antagonist, vindicated!

Kant's proof is next to be "limited," etc., and Schopenhauer's own proof substituted for it. The whole of Schopenhauer's claim in the averment, however, is simply Kantian; "empirically we only cognize *actuality* of succession, but in certain cases we cognize "necessity" as well, etc., "so there follow at once from this the reality and *a priori* validity of the law of causality." Schopenhauer, having utterly reprobated the case of Kant, only holds it up to him again as the very thing he should have done!

Schopenhauer now remarks on Kant's doctrine of reciprocity; but what is said refers, for point, to another section, where we find, as hitherto, only failures to understand. For instance, when Kant talks of things being separated by a wholly empty space, he means an absolute vacuum of existence, a cleft absolute, and not the participating empty spaces of the astronomical heavens. This, then, we pass.

For wind-up, now, we have, on the part of Schopenhauer, only expressions of veneration for Kant, and deprecating apologies. He appends a line from Homer, intimating that, like the goddess in the case of Diomede, Kant had purged for him his eye-sight. Diomede was, in consequence of the operation, to be able clearly to distinguish god and man; but Kant's influence on Schopenhauer has been to make appear before the eyes of this latter, not Kant's own plain self, but the most extraordinary and contradictory hermaphrodite of god and man that it were possible even to dream.⁵

Samples, then, enough of the ἀχλὺς which Schopenhauer thanks Kant for removing, we have seen to remain; but these samples are very far from exhausting the supply. There is nobody whom Schopenhauer boasts himself to know better than he knows Kant, and it is certainly hardly possible that one man should know another worse. There are eleven other categories besides that of causality, and in regard to each of these Schopenhauer is as ignorant as in regard to the latter. Without very well knowing what they are for, and how they are to act, he rejects them all, with the single exception of causality, which, nevertheless, as we have seen, he will accept only on his own terms—terms involving capital mistakes only as to the terms of Kant. That is, Schopenhauer rejects all that (“theoretically”) is really good in Kant—sug-

⁵ In the foregoing, as well as in what follows, other portions (besides the one translated) of the book in question, and, also, Schopenhauer's chief work, “*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*,” are occasionally in allusion. It is particularly in the latter work that Schopenhauer reprobates Kant's introduction into perception of forms of reflection. Notwithstanding this reprobation, it is the same Schopenhauer quotes approvingly, the *νοῦς ὁρᾷ* of Epicharmus, and similarly refers to the authority of Plutarch for the necessity of mind to sense. See the former work, about page 80.

gestion, namely, in regard to collection and tabulation of the categories as the concrete contents of pure thought. But, *en revanche*, he loudly and fervently accepts from Kant all of his that (with "theoretical" reference) is either questionable or of no account. As any one may understand without much reflection, it is only an abuse of the commonest common-sense to tell us we do not perceive actual outer independent things in an actual outer independent space and time; but it is just this telling that Schopenhauer receives from Kant with the most extravagant gratitude. That is to him the foundation of the imperishable glory of Kant—that time and space are only subjective *spectra* of our own, and objects, or what are called things, only apparent projection into these *spectra* of our own subjective affections. These, nevertheless, are but samples of Kantian contributions that are, really, of no account. Equivocal contributions, again, are what concerns theology ("scholasticism") in Kant, the various refutations of the arguments, ontological, cosmological, and teleological, for the being of a God. Naturally, in his "enlightenment," namely, Schopenhauer is specially thankful for these. In practical reference, he accepts from Kant the absoluteness of will, but rejects—scornfully—the categorical imperative, and, with it, free will, though praising the (worthless) distinction by which Kant would save it! In fact, he accepts from Kant—his own whole philosophy indeed!—only the "*Maja*," only what Reid scourged as the "ideal system;" all the rest he rejects; and yet he declares "his whole exposition is merely the *completion* of the Kantian transcendental idealism!" (Op. cit. pref.)

But said *ἀλλόως* in Schopenhauer is not limited to Kant. In other references as well, there seem partial scales over his eyes which isolate his vision into compartments of that *empty-space* separation which—naturally!—he so signally misunderstands in Kant. His different views, that is, seem each in an independent, unparticipating world of its own, absolutely without relation to anything else. Take his scheme of perception, for example, a scheme on the credit of which he is perpetually glorifying himself, claiming here for himself, in-

deed, almost as much glory as for his refutation of Kant's categories — a large portion of it consists of these inferences to which are due what we call here the “acquired perceptions of sense” — organic sensations of the eye itself, misty or clear appearance of the object in itself or relatively, etc. But it is only on the ordinary understanding of an external world that such theory of acquired perceptions is really practicable or consistent, and it denotes inextricable confusion in the mind of Schopenhauer that he should still attempt to adopt such theory while no objects exist to him but his own subjective sensations. Besides these acquired perceptions, there is, in Schopenhauer's general theory, only one other leading point, and it is the one on which he lays the greatest stress. We possess *a priori* the category of causality, he says, and by virtue of its possession we refer our subjective states to their causes; and thus it is that an objective world is at once realized around us. It is hardly possible to suppose anything weaker — unless, that is, there be an outer reality. I have the subjective affection of sweetness or of greenness, and my category of causality compels me to refer these to a cause. To what cause? There is nothing but themselves. Is it to the sweetness as cause I am to refer the sweetness as effect, or am I to refer the greenness as effect to the greenness as cause? To what as causes are the subjective affections to be referred? If we have only subjective affections, as Schopenhauer avers, then the category has nothing else to refer them to but their own selves. That any man should start with the material of subjective affection only, and should so lightly, easily, and confusedly see it grow into the formed world around us, through the category of causality, and the acquired perceptions of sense alone! Such philosophizing is the very *Capuchinery* of thought.

Nor is Schopenhauer ever seen at any greater advantage wherever else he *philosophizes*. Schopenhauer is not a philosopher, but a *littérateur*; and, as a *littérateur*, he is, on the whole, quite legitimately a subject for admiration. He is thoroughly educated, and, as it is called, well-read — an actual expert in several languages and literatures, ancient and

modern. He has, in the same direction also, gifts of his own. He is really, as it is said, brilliant — expressing himself well always, and possessed of no little ingenuity and wit. Still, even here, I know not that he can offer contributions of any objective value. A sally in a sentence will not repay the reading of a volume. Altogether, it is difficult to see for what it was that the neglected Schopenhauer looked forward to compensation at the hands of our grandchildren. Our grandchildren will certainly gain no good from his weak, bungling attempts at philosophizing; and there is really not enough of possible literary profit to tempt expenditure of time upon him. That the Pessimists should regard him as their father and founder, may be natural enough; but still, surely, they are men on their own account, and need not be, or are not, at all indebted to any standing-ground borrowed from him.

Schopenhauer's deliverances in regard to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel may be referred to as in no small degree determinative of his relative level. Had he known Kant, he would have known them. That he did not know them is the convincing proof that he did not know Kant. And he did not know them. He contrasts his own "completion of the Kantian transcendental idealism," of which we can now judge, with "Fichte's humbug." An opinion of Schelling's is a "*Curiosum*," a "*leichtfertiges In-den-Tag-hinein-Schwätzen*, which deserves no place among the opinions of earnest and honest inquirers." And, as for Hegel, it seems impossible for him to find words opprobrious enough; he absolutely foams at the mouth on thought of the bare name. When "one's mind, with Hegel's insane word-collocations in regard, in vain martyrs and exhausts itself in the attempt to think something," the result is "disorganization of brain;" for "what is *Hegelei* else," he asks, "than empty, hollow, disgusting *Wortkram*?" And so, "out of a common head, nay, out of a common charlatan, there is made," he sneers, "a great philosopher!" — a great philosopher who, in truth, he repeats, is but "an arrant quack!"

Now, Fichte and Schelling may not have succeeded; but, surely, it was at least a great and suggestive problem they

took in hand. Nor less certain is it that as much—with whatever righteous additional emphasis—can be said for Hegel. Like Plato's "Republic," the system of Hegel is to me, in a certain sense, only a poem, only an ideal; but that ideal is the ideal (and idea) at last of a *completed philosophy*. Aristotle has, in a certain way, "gropings" after a like object; but, as disjunct, whatever they be in themselves, they may, on the whole, be named "blind;" and no man but Hegel in this universe has produced for this universe what may prove the key—terms of *explanation* that at length come up to need. And Schopenhauer, whether he accepted it or not, ought, at all events, to have seen as much.

But, Schopenhauer apart, how many see this, even now? Who sees that a touch converts Kant into Hegel, and yet that the latter, after all, is to the former very much as reality to dream? Who sees that? and it has been already shown in many ways. In one other way, and at its shortest, perhaps, let it be shown once again now.

Kant's one peculiar act subjectively is Hegel's one peculiar act objectively. That one peculiar act in both (Kant's one peculiar act, consequently) is the Notion of Hegel. Consider Kant's theory of perception! So considering, is it not manifest to you that Kant's one act is, through categories, *Begriff* (the *Universal*), to reduce the manifold or multiple of sense (the *Particular*) into the Unity of Apperception, Self-consciousness (the *Singular*)—and what is that but *the Notion of Hegel*?

How that notion is *explanation* at length, *how* it is the key of the universe, this is not the place to demonstrate. We may say, however, that had but Schopenhauer caught a glimpse of this, had he but caught a glimpse of the transformation now witnessed—and, necessarily then—of the considerations involved, we should have been spared much. Nay, had he but caught a glimpse of Kant's one act, the theory of perception, as namable thus—*Begriff*, with Kant, is that mental act which, combining the particulars of sense into unity, isolates and individualizes them into separate, single, and distinct, but correlated, objects, or entities, in time and

space — is it conceivable that he would have so belabored the full Kant, and exalted in disparagement his own poor, meagre, warped, and piecemeal self?

So far, however, as blindness to either Kant or Hegel is concerned, it is only fair to Schopenhauer to regard him as but, of many sinners, one; at the same time that, at least in the latter case, excuses are not wanting. Hegel, in dialect and dialectic is, for every ordinary reader, utterly unintelligible. So it is that we see how very unsatisfactory — after so many years — the general study still remains. Readers who can quite as easily satisfy themselves in regard to the meaning of a Hume or a Berkeley, as in regard to the meaning of a Scott or a Dickens, naturally lose all patience with a Hegel, in whom not one sentence seems to have sense, and eagerly meet the spite of baffled countrymen of his own, who would be glad to think the *unused* already used up and done with. But the truth is far otherwise. If the key has been found for the casket of Hegel, and its contents described, it is quite certain that the public has never yet seriously set itself to apply this key, or examine these contents. Something to stimulate or assist seems still to be wanting. Much, of course, lies in the very temper of the time. It is out of the materials of that casket, however, that we are to build the bridge which, leaving the episode behind, leads to the long epic of the race. Hegel's act is, probably, as the opening of the final seal into the consciousness of man. It is very interesting to hear him tell Goethe (on whom such ideas never dawned) that "where he [Goethe] places the Inscrutable and Incomprehensible, precisely there Philosophy dwells — precisely thence draws vindication, explanation, and deduction." Hegel's work shall be now dead, and yet how many are there in existence who can form any conjecture here of what Hegel means? America, at present, is perhaps the very loudest in despair (see *Princeton Review* for March and May); and yet, in all probability, it is precisely America that is the place of hope. What we may call *academic accomplishment* has seized the Germans. They desire only learnedly to *state*; but *what* they state is, but too often, *external* merely. How many statements have there not

been of Schopenhauer, to go no further, and which of them shows even a glimpse into the truth of his relation to Kant? Nay, which of them has ever tested and compared with their own selves the various pieces in the machinery of this very Kant? Certainly not, in either case, any of them that I know. As it is in Germany, so it is in England. We, too, are contented, if we shall but appear learnedly to state. We master not the proposition, but only what is said of it by all that host of imposing foreign names, who, empty nut-shells for the most part, are themselves but mocked by similar shadows. The "literature of the subject," bless you! what is the "subject" itself to that? Exhibiting not one tittle of evidence in proof, we *assume* to know the last and supreme formula, and to be justified, accordingly, in treating all others as *de haut en bas*. We, too, are academically decorous; writing words so soft, unincisive, unimpressive — putty-like — that they leave the reader vacuous. But all this is otherwise in America, where the true fuel finds itself at least fairly alight. In America, and not in England, it is that there are Kant clubs, and Aristotle clubs, and scores of young men meeting weekly to initiate themselves, with boundless appreciation, even into the adamant Hegel.

But, be all that as it may, the ignorance of Schopenhauer in regard to his own great contemporaries shall be the concluding trait in the portrait we would draw of him; and we may now explain what it was that gave this operation itself occasion. It lay in the essay on the "Philosophy of Causality," engaged to write which, it was recollected that Schopenhauer was very specially referred to by Mr. Caird, as well in connection with Kant as with the particular subject named; and, accordingly, the necessity of consultation was obviously suggested. One or two earlier allusions to Schopenhauer may, indeed, be found on my part; but it was now only that, by direct examination, I enabled myself to speak at first hand — with what result may be now judged.

But the reference itself, even in relation to Mr. Caird, demands a word. It concerns "Schopenhauer's Objection to the Deduction of Causality," and occurs at page 456 of "A

Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant." In regard to this objection itself, we have already, presumably, light enough; and may, allowably, therefore, venture to judge of the manner in which Mr. Caird views it.

Mr. Caird's relative eleventh chapter, headed, "The Principles of Pure Understanding," opens with Kant's simple distinction between his mathematical and his dynamical categories (a distinction which, as the essay on the "Philosophy of Causality" shows, is pretty well Hume's). The former (quantity and quality) evidently enter into, and form part of, objects themselves; while the latter (relation and modality) concern — *that* (relation) the modes in which objects exist in reference to each other, and *this* (modality) the modes in which they exist in reference to our minds. And what is meant is obvious. There is no difficulty in seeing that extension and intension are *in* houses, paints, syrups, etc.; while, substantiality, causality, and reciprocity concern the existence of things in each other's regard, and possibility, actuality, and necessity the same existence as respectively differing in validity for the mind (what is possible is less valid than what is actual, etc.). That the two classes should be also contrasted as "intuitive and discursive," and, again, as "constitutive and regulative," is plain at a glance, at the same time that these terms make the general interest unmistakable.

What Mr. Caird observes here is "that this distinction is now transferred to the Principles of Pure Understanding, and it therefore becomes important to determine its exact meaning." The transference spoken of is, simply, that the categories, as further discussed, are discussed in the classes the distinction gives. That the distinction itself, once made, should be found to continue, seems as little calculated to give pause, as its meaning (inherence *versus* relativity) to puzzle. All that requires now to be understood is that the categories give rise to certain "*Grundsätze*." This German word may, certainly, be translated "*principles*;" but it is important that these principles should be seen to be in the form of *propositions*, main or fundamental propositions, which are successively named "axioms," "anticipations," "analogies," and

“postulates.” In short, there is nothing to call specially for remark, whether as regards the transference (which, as said, is only a continuation to be expected and taken without note), or as regards the “distinction,” which Kant himself (and surely with reason) thinks it enough merely to mention. Mr. Caird, however, considers it necessary to enlarge here into a copiousness of remark and illustration, in the midst of which one finds one’s self uneasily on the quest for relevancy.

For example, we find it said: “The distinction, as drawn by Kant, may be stated as follows: it is possible to represent or imagine objects without determining them as existent,” etc. This, of course, is only an edge, so to speak, of the key-note which pervades a paragraph. It will suggest, however, that the distinction in question is regarded as turning essentially on the determination of existence as such. Now, can it be taken ill of any one who pretends to any Kantian acquirement, should he ask, with a sort of wonder, What, pray, has that got to do with the intrinsic properties of objects as against their extrinsic relations? Kant is quite as willing “to determine objects as existent” in the case of his mathematical categories, as in that of the dynamical ones. The ridge between the two slopes is not at all the consideration of existence. Kant has no idea that his illustrations in reference to a house, degrees of resistance, degrees of heat, etc., will be supposed to concern imagination only, while drifting ships, indenting bullets, warming stones, etc., shall be exclusively determined as “existent.” Both classes of objects are constructed in the imagination, and in precisely the same manner; they differ only in the categories to which they owe objectivity. But, more than that, both classes of objects are *equally* determined as existent.

Another distinction, or rather, another wording of the same distinction, which immediately follows is to a like effect. In the *Kritik of Pure Reason* (WW. II, 760), Kant has a foot-note to his table of “*Grundsätze*,” which runs thus: “All *conjunction* is either *composition* or *connection*. The former is a synthesis in which the individuals do *not* necessarily belong the one to the other. For example, the two

triangles into which the diagonal divides a square do not, considered *per se*, belong to each other. Of this nature is the *homogeneous* synthesis in everything that can be *mathematically* regarded. Such synthesis, also, is either one of *aggregation* or one of *coalition*, the former referring to *extensive*, and the other to *intensive*, magnitudes. The second conjunction, *connection*, on the other hand is a synthesis in which the individuals necessarily *do* belong the one to the other — as, accident to substance, effect to cause. This synthesis (as seen from the examples) is *heterogeneous*, and yet conceived as *a priori*. This conjunction, now, I name *dynamical*, as not being discretionary, but depending existentially on the individuals in it. This *dynamical* conjunction, lastly, is also capable of a twofold division — into, first, the *physical* one of objects mutually; and, second, the *metaphysical* one of objects in their relation to the mental faculty.”

There is nothing shadowed out in this note but synthesis as under each of the four categories — quantity, quality, relation, and modality. It serves no purpose but to allow Kant the indulgence of his passion for words and phrases that shall be felicitously distinctive; and, certainly, there is enough here in that kind to please any one. Hume opposes *conjunction* to *connection*, but Kant opposes *composition* to *connection*, and subordinates both as *species* under *conjunction* as *genus*. Then each *species* falls into two *sub-species*. *Composition* (*mathematical* synthesis or conjunction) is either the *aggregation* of *extensive* magnitudes, or the *coalition* of *intensive* magnitudes; while *connection* (*dynamical* synthesis or conjunction) is either *physical* (relation — substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction) or *metaphysical* (modality — possibility, actuality, necessity, etc.). Then the terms in the different syntheses, naturally, are also necessarily different. Under composition, for example, they are like in kind (*homogeneous*), but they do *not* necessarily belong to each other (in the sense of the one being existentially due to the other — as, the effect to the cause). Whereas, under connection, again, they are different in kind (*heterogeneous*), and yet *do* necessarily belong the one to the other (in the sense of being existen-

tially due, etc.). There is not an atom of difficulty or ambiguity in the entire passage; and that individuals here are existentially due, and there are *not* existentially due, the one to the other, has not the slightest reference to distinction between objects as existent or non-existent.

Mr. Caird, apparently, however, does not so readily find himself at home in the passage. The paragraph (pages 440–442) constitutes his relative commentary, and it is to the effect as follows: “Homogeneous elements which do not necessarily belong to each other,” he conceives to refer to that peculiarity in quantity according to which “it can be increased or diminished without limit; all that is determined by these principles, therefore, is, *not* that you must combine any element with any other, but that if you do so, you must do it in a particular way!” Now, all that Kant means, so far, is only, as we have seen, a synthesis of like to like, which “*likes*” are still indifferent to one another, and do not cause one another. The particles of any stone are such. Surely, then, Mr. Caird either sees something quite dissimilar to this, or only conveys this with such left-handedness as sets hopelessly at fault. And what follows is worse. When Kant only wants it to be understood that the connection of substance and accident, cause and effect, may be described as a “synthesis of heterogeneous elements which belong to each other,” Mr. Caird seems suddenly lost in a labyrinth, in which, coherency there is none. There is still, to be sure, external cheerfulness of speech; but the internal uneasiness is revealed by this little foot-note: “Cf. Spinoza, l. c. In the above account of Kant’s doctrine I have been obliged to introduce more of my own interpretation than usual; I could not otherwise get a distinct meaning out of Kant’s words.” And, no doubt, this is accurately the nature of the case here and elsewhere. Mr. Caird, unable “otherwise to get a distinct meaning out of Kant’s words,” only all too often sees into them *tropes*. A simpler passage than what we have translated it is surely impossible to find anywhere, whether in Kant or another; and it is not easy to express one’s surprise that it should have been so perverted or sublimed, so disfigured or

transformed. Nor are the neighboring passages different. "Relation of imagination to knowledge," "Freedom of the imagination due to abstraction," "Limitation of knowledge by imagination," etc. — these, too, can but seem to us, as it were, bones of the hippogriff, instead of the simple articulations of Kant; and we are reminded of the "crabs, goats, scorpions, the balance and the water-pot," which, according to Mr. Emerson, "lose all their meanness [here, meaning] when hung as signs in the Zodiac."

The truth is that Kant has a peculiar plan of his own to propose, and it is only misseen when the beams of his workshop are extended into the firmament. These vessels and utensils are all, very specially, his; and it has neither consistency nor meaning to lift any one of them out of its own limited perspective. No doubt, points do crop up here and there in Kant that may profitably receive a general application, and where names may be in place (hardly ever Spinoza's); but, for the most part, that is not so, and we only lose ourselves when we leave the very homely bounds of the critical manufactory. Consider the mischief that results, too — chimeras of the brain offered as problems to the schools, and an idle babble endlessly protracted! "Notice: No admittance except on business." By this placard we know what is *sui generis*, and on its own account; and by just such placard is the Kantian gateway overhung and guarded. It is idle to approach such eminently private workshop as though it were a cosmical treasure-house, and each plain implement were to be taken up with the child-like awe that only sees marvels of the universe. But our object here is special, and we may, accordingly, limit ourselves.

"This is Kant's general argument. There are, however, a few inconsistent or ambiguous statements introduced into it, and especially into that part which refers to the principle of causality, which must be examined before we can fully justify the above interpretation of it. Thus, at the beginning of his discussion of the second *analogy of experience*, Kant distinguishes two cases: the case of such an object as a house, where the sequence of our perceptions is reversible; and the case of a boat sailing [no, no, not "sailing," *drifting*; it is

the current, and not the wind, that is to be regarded as the cause acting] down a river, where it is irreversible. We can begin with either the top or the bottom of the house, but we cannot see the movements of the boat except in one order. [We might have seen it moving up, down, along, across, or in any direction, if "sailing," and not mere drifting at control of the current, had been taken into account.] In the latter case, therefore, as Kant argues, we give to our perception of succession an objective value; but in the former case we regard it as merely subjective; or, what is the same thing, in the latter case we bring the sequence of our perceptions under the category of causality, and in the former case we do not." Mr. Caird, in writing this, supposes himself to be approaching "Schopenhauer's objection," and no doubt correctly, as we now superabundantly know. Still, Mr. Caird writes this from himself; he is not reporting from another. This is not the *oratio obliqua*; these are Mr. Caird's own opinions. His reference to "inconsistent or ambiguous statements," "especially" in what concerns "the principle of causality," is direct; and equally direct is his intimation that this inconsistency or ambiguity concerns Kant's statements in regard to succession in the case of a house as contrasted with succession in the case of a drifting ship. Further, this also is direct: that Kant characterizes the one succession as subjective, and the other as objective. Than this, there is no other possible understanding here. But Mr. Caird conveys the same ideas even more strongly (not more directly) elsewhere. At page 454 he says: "Kant argues that the judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the presupposition of the judgment of *causality*;" and at page 451 he had already said: "Hume had maintained that the principle of causality is simply the general expression of a subjective habit of mind, which is due to the repeated experience of sequence; the *post hoc* is the reality which, by an illusion of the imagination, is turned into the *propter hoc*; Kant answers that the experience of the *post hoc* is itself impossible except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect." "The judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the presupposition of the judgment of causality!" "The experience of

the *post hoc* is itself impossible except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect!!” “No mind is capable of the cognition *post hoc* that is not already capable of the cognition *propter hoc*!!!”

“Were such things here as we do speak about,
Or have we eaten of the insane root
That takes the reason prisoner?”

It was a fearful blunder on the part of Schopenhauer to suppose Kant considered the succession of the house subjective, and no succession objective but that of causality alone. As we see, Mr. Caird fully indorses that blunder — the radical blunder that is the theme of this essay; but then, further, he out-Herods Herod. Schopenhauer, even making the prodigious blunder he did, was never so far left to himself as to conceive the cognition of succession as succession only possible to Kant on presupposition of causality. Following *on* was to him as much *sui generis* as following *from*. One vainly turns the eye round and round in search of how and where Mr. Caird could get even the dream of such things. Kant shall have held it impossible to cognize the rows on his bookshelves, the steps on his stairs, the laths in his Venetians, etc., endlessly, unless on presupposition of the category of causality! Why, there are successions even *necessarily* in the form A B C D, etc., which are not causal, and utterly independent of causality in any reference. Everybody has heard the chimes — at midnight, or whenever else. Ding-ding-dong-ding, ding-ding-dong-ding; it is quite certain that each chime has its fixed place in the series — has at least the *position* of a necessary consequent in the one direction, as of a necessary antecedent in the other; and yet causality has nothing whatever to do with either the sequence or the necessity. Ten minutes to nine must absolutely precede five minutes to nine; one o'clock, two o'clock; Sunday, Monday; May, June — in short, every one moment of time another, just as every atom of space is beside another, on this side and on that, and on all sides. These are successions — necessary, too — and they are absolutely independent of causality, whether as existent or as cognized. Nor is it possible for any man to find Kant, at last, otherwise than fully awake to all that these things imply.

Even Mr. Caird, in fact, only saves himself to himself here, by resolutely looking away from all these homely considerations (which are really all that Kant entertains), and having recourse to that expedient of cosmical transelementation to which there has been already allusion. It is in reference to the unity of the universe, and the correlation of all its parts, he thinks, that there is justification for Kant's (never made) assertion that objectivity results from the category of causality alone! It is quite true that Kant will have the world a correlated unity; but it is not true that he will have the causal category as this unity's sole source. Every single *category* — and there are twelve of them — is *constitutive*, as every single *idea* — and there are three of them — is *regulative*, of this unity. Kant, consequently, cannot even dream of making cognition of succession, as such, conditional on presupposition of succession causal. If Mr. Caird will consider Kant's own illustrations of causality, he will find what a homely empirical role that category is supposed to fulfill, and that, too, only beside others which equally with it bestow unity, which equally with it bestow objectivity, and so bestow objectivity that even the succession in a house is not subjective; and never was either thought subjective or called subjective by Kant himself. "Kant," Mr. Caird says (p. 457), "either forgets or abstracts for the moment from the fact that whether we say the sequence is due (as in the case of the house) to the movement of our organs of sense, or whether we say that it is due to the movements of the objects perceived (as in the case of the boat) — in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence." Of course, it would be absurd seriously to attempt to show that this sentence were quite as relevant to the precession of the equinoxes as to Kant; but is not the influence of Schopenhauer, to which it is wholly and solely due, eminently regrettable? But there is no pleasure to me in this duty that, parenthetically so to speak, has fallen upon me; and with these half-dozen hints — honest, as they must be — I gladly leave it.⁶

⁶ Only through ability to discern *propter hoc*, first of all, is it possible to discern *post hoc*! Were not the *post* of the *house* and the *propter* of the *ship* but a moment ago independently and specifically side by side? To Kant himself, even in

There is such a thing as a literal understanding of Kant, in which the alphabet A B C D, etc., is the alphabet A B C D, etc.; and there is also such a thing as an *oneiromantic* understanding of Kant, in which W is a windmill, K a kite, and O an owl. Or, there is an internal understanding of Kant, and there is an external understanding of Kant. The internal understanding smelts, melts, fuses all manner of earthy provisional matter into a single diamond-point that mirrors and comprehends all; and he who possesses it sees all at a glance, and can tell all in one word or a thousand. The external understanding, again, is academical, exegetical, formal; and all Kant's distinctions—analysis, synthesis, axioms, anticipations, analogies, postulates, paralogisms, antinomies, etc.—verbally appear in it, one after the other, as a series of *frames* that contain nothing, or that contain nightmares; while he that possesses it is accordingly conditioned. Such things are exemplified, for the most part, by almost scores of "*Introductions*" sent in from all sides. And yet it is remarkable that, always excepting Schopenhauer of course, all the Germans known to me who write on Kant—Erdmann, Ueberweg, Schwegeler, Rosenkranz, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Edmund Montgomery, *al.*—are, in the sense indicated, *literalists*. One would have expected such teaching to have been generally adopted; but, no; on the contrary, with the exception of Americans, most members of other nationalities who affect the theme seem largely to disdain the letter, and even to prefer, as we may surmise, the cabala of dream. In England the very mention of German philosophy would seem to repugn. It is only the neighboring island that shows any interest in the subject. If any one will cast his eyes over these periodical *Kottabos's* and *Hermathena's*, or the more permanent classical and philosophical works that issue from the press of

causality, does not the subjective *post hoc* precede and condition the objective *propter hoc*? Is it not similarly situated with the categories as a whole? Is not Kant's one problem to explain *how* the evident and unquestioned *post hoc* can contain the mysterious and doubted *propter hoc*? Or just consider this—if the *propter hoc* precedes and conditions the *post hoc*, how did it ever occur to call the house-series subjective?

Dublin, he will recognize that the *life* of learning and philosophy—no longer to be found at Oxford or at Cambridge, at Edinburgh or Aberdeen—is still vigorous in Ireland's Trinity. While there are Thompsons and Jowetts, and such eminent younger strengths as Bywater, England indeed cannot be said to be without Greek, and philosophical Greek. (As for Scotland, though the veteran Dr. William Veitch, of Edinburgh, is probably the greatest philological Grecian out of Germany, the Scotch, on the whole, have no Greek.) Still, as intimated, it is in Dublin that Greek, and philosophical Greek, may at this moment be regarded as, through strength of mutual association, *living*. There quite a fire of genius would seem to burn now. Maguire, Mahaffy, Monck, Graham, and a whole host of others emulously wrestle with each other, and communicate to their countrymen quite a heat of learning and philosophy. In the midst of such an intellectual life, Kant, as may be supposed, has not been neglected. And yet (will it be possible to forgive me?) I have experienced a certain dissatisfaction with most of the Irish works that I have seen on Kant. They are too academical, too exegetical, too formal. With those eternal Mill-references, and other such, they have, somehow, an old-fashioned look. I would have men of such real accomplishments, real endowments—more than formalists. It almost pains one to the core to think that such a gracious, vigorous, and thoroughly equipped intellect as Mahaffy's should *allow* itself to remain, at least as regards the *best* of German philosophy, so glaringly on the outside. An article in the *Princeton Review* for July—which, by the by, is the immediate occasion, and “only begetter,” of the directly preceding remarks—offers, in this connection, much material for comment; but I must simply allow it to take its place on the kind earth, amid so much else that is to be used as seed, according to Carlyle, or simply disintegrated as so much chaff. And with this I conclude, trusting always that something of a lesson has been read, not wholly inapplicable, whether to Schopenhauer, or to Kant, or whoever else.